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Who Decides Whether Clarity is 
Clear?: 
An Analysis of TILA’s Clarity of 
Disclosure Requirement in Actions by 
Consumers Against Creditor Card 
Companies 
 
Brandon Mohr* 
 
Introduction 
 
Courts are currently split on the following issue: When a consumer 
sues a credit card company for violating the Truth In Lending Act (TILA 
or the “Act”) by claiming that the terms specified in the credit card 
agreement are unclear, is the clarity of disclosure of the terms of the 
agreement a question of law to be decided by the court or a question of 
fact better left for the jury? In the early part of the twenty-first century 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit found that fact-
finders were best equipped to determine whether the credit card 
companies had satisfied the statute’s requirements to disclose the terms 
of the agreement clearly.
1
 In recent years, however, circuit courts from 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh and Ninth Circuits 
have found that the clarity of disclosure of credit agreement terms is 
more appropriately decided as a matter of law by the court.
2
 
TILA requires credit agreement terms to be disclosed to consumers 
 
       *  J.D. candidate, Pace University School of Law (2012); B.A., The College of 
Wooster (2002). The Author wishes to thank his wife, Stefanie Mohr, and his entire 
family for their tremendous support and encouragement during law school as well as the 
editors and members of the Pace Law Review for their assistance with this Article. 
1. See Roberts v. Fleet Bank (R.I.), N.A., 342 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2003); Rossman v. 
Fleet Bank (R.I.) N.A., 280 F.3d 384 (3d Cir. 2002). 
2. See Rubio v. Capital One Bank, 613 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 
S. Ct. 1817 (2011); Barrer v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 566 F.3d 883 (9th Cir. 2009); 
Hamm v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 506 F.3d 525 (7th Cir. 2007). 
1
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“clearly and conspicuously.”3 The statute, however, fails to define either 
term. Moreover, it does not provide any type of framework or guidance 
for analyzing whether credit agreement terms are disclosed clearly and 
conspicuously and, more importantly, who should make the 
determination. To help construct an appropriate standard, courts have 
borrowed from various sources to establish how each word should be 
evaluated.
4
 While little disagreement exists regarding conspicuousness 
being decided as a question of law by the court, clarity involves greater 
discord.
5
 
Both the clarity and the conspicuousness requirements exist in the 
statute to impart a sense of how the credit agreement terms are to be 
disclosed, but they do not necessarily need to be treated identically. Even 
a cursory review of the definitions of each word indicates that each 
means something slightly different.
6
 So if each word individually is 
supposed to represent a different requirement that credit card companies 
must meet to satisfy TILA’s obligatory disclosure, then clarity does not 
necessarily need to be decided as a question of law by the court just 
because conspicuousness is analyzed in such a manner. 
While conspicuousness requires courts to decide whether the 
disclosed information is visually noticeable within the credit agreement 
terms and solicitation materials, clarity focuses on whether the consumer 
intellectually understands the information itself.
7
 Allowing courts to 
decide what consumers will and will not understand places too much 
discretion with the courts on an issue that would be more properly 
decided by the finders of fact. Therefore, when analyzing the clarity of 
disclosure by credit card companies of credit agreement terms, the 
determination of whether the requisite level of clarity has been achieved 
should be a question of fact decided by the fact-finder. 
Section 1 will begin by discussing credit card usage and the levels 
of debt of American consumers. Section 2 will outline the history of 
TILA, which was promulgated by Congress in 1968, as well as the 
enforcement power bestowed by Congress on the Federal Reserve Board 
to implement TILA.
8
 This exploration will also include descriptions of 
 
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1632 (2009). 
4. See infra text accompanying notes 144-54. 
5. Rubio, 613 F.3d at 1209 n.5; see also supra notes 1-2. 
6. See infra Part IV.C. 
7. See infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text. 
8. John A. Marold, Third Circuit’s Decision in Roberts v. Fleet Bank: Thinking 
Outside of the “Schumer Box” or “Consumerism Gone Berserk?,” 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/5
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Regulation Z and the Schumer Box requirements that state exactly what 
information needs to be clearly and conspicuously displayed in credit 
card application materials as well as how the information is to be 
displayed for consumers to review. Section 3 will discuss the recent 
Ninth Circuit case, Rubio v. Capital One,
9
 where the court decided the 
clarity of disclosure as a question of law. The dissent from Rubio will 
also be analyzed because the position taken is in accord with the Third 
Circuit opinion of Roberts v. Fleet Bank,
10
 where the clarity of disclosure 
was left as a question of fact for the jury. Section 4 will outline the 
Roberts case, and the court’s decision to analyze clarity of disclosure as a 
question of fact, in more detail. The fifth and final Section will 
recommend leaving clarity of disclosure as a question of fact to be 
decided by a fact-finder. 
 
I. Credit Card Debt 
 
Today there are more than a billion credit cards in use.
11
 The sheer 
size of the industry is not lost on credit card companies as they 
continuously search for new ways to make money from cardholders. 
During the past decade, credit card companies have shifted away from 
charging cardholders annual fees and are now opting for late fees that 
trigger penalty interest rates.
12
 Currently, the Annual Percentage Rate 
(APR), which is the interest rate charged to credit card holders, is at a 
national average of 14.71 percent
13
 However, those with bad credit, who 
are required to pay penalty APRs, are being charged an average of 24.95 
percent on their outstanding credit card balances.
14
 These high APRs are 
arguably the most significant factor contributing to American’s average 
 
399, 403 (2004). 
9. Rubio, 613 F.3d 1195. 
10. Roberts v. Fleet Bank (R.I.), N.A., 342 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2003). 
11. Jeffrey Kimball Paulsen, Credit Card Disclosure and the Elderly: Will the 
Proposed Amendments to Regulation Z Help the Elderly Understand Credit Card 
Documents?, 17 ELDER L.J. 125, 127 (2009). 
12. Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. Delaney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 157, 163 (2006). “Consumer groups have suggested that this combination of late 
fees and penalty rates is convincing evidence of ‘anti-consumer policies employed by 
credit card companies to force cardholders to slide deeper into debt.’” Id. 
13. Weekly Credit Card Rate Report, CREDITCARDS.COM (Jan. 5, 2011), 
http://www.creditcards.com/press-releases/CreditCards-Weekly-Credit-Card-Rate-
Report-January-05-2011.php. 
14. Id. 
3
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credit card debt of $15,799 per household.
15
 
The record debt levels we see today begin with one of the credit 
card companies’ target markets—students. By soliciting students, lenders 
are able to hook consumers at a young age into paying for items on credit 
until they become so dependent on credit cards that they amass debt 
amounts that are virtually unpayable.
16
 Minorities
17
 and the elderly
18
 
attract the attention of credit card companies as well, and these groups 
often carry significant balances which can ultimately result in higher than 
average APRs. 
 
15. Ben Woolsey & Matt Schulz, Credit Card Statistics, Industry Facts, Debt 
Statistics, CREDITCARDS.COM, http://www.creditcards.com/credit-card-news/credit-card-
industry-facts-personal-debt-statistics-1276.php (last updated July 14, 2011). 
16. See Study Finds Rising Number of College Students Using Credit Cards for 
Tuition, SALLIE MAE (Apr. 13, 2009), 
https://www1.salliemae.com/about/news_info/newsreleases/041309.htm. 
 
     Eighty-four percent of undergraduates had at least one credit card, 
up from 76 percent in 2004. . . . The average (mean) balance grew to 
$3,173, higher than any of the previous studies. . . . 
 
     . . . . 
 
     The study found that: 
 
     Sixty percent [of students] experienced surprise at how high their 
balances had reached, and 40 percent said they have charged items 
knowing they did not have the money to pay the bill. 
 
Id. 
17. See Woolsey & Schulz, supra note 15. “In 2004, of those with credit cards, 84 
percent of African-American households carried credit card debt compared with 54 
percent of white households.” Id. In a 2009 study conducted by the FINRA Investor 
Education Foundation, 44 percent of Hispanics surveyed reported having at least two 
credit cards. Id. 
18. See Paulson, supra note 11. “[F]inancial literacy among elders is lower than for 
any other age group.” Id. at 132. 
 
[The elderly] are trusting and trustworthy, believe in meeting any 
obligation incurred, and are more likely to be homeowners, confined 
to home, or on a fixed income. Because of these vulnerabilities, the 
elderly are often targeted by predatory lenders seeking to tap into 
their home equity, payday loan companies, and consumer scam 
artists—and also credit card companies. 
 
Id. at 130. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/5
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II. Truth In Lending Act 
 
In 1968, Congress passed TILA in an effort to protect consumers 
from unethical lenders.
19
 These lenders had been employing various 
tricks and bait-and-switch tactics to trap consumers in contracts 
containing unfair terms.
20
 Specifically, these contracts would subject 
consumers to unreasonably high interest rates.
21
 Consumers would enter 
into credit agreements expecting specific interest rates, only to be 
charged much higher rates by lenders.
22
 
Unfortunately, such predatory and misleading tactics by some 
lenders did not cease with the original passage of TILA.
23
 In fact, since 
being passed into law, TILA has been amended multiple times in an 
effort to perfect the consumer protections first desired in 1968.
24
 
While many Americans today find themselves in a downward 
financial spiral because of mounting levels of credit card debt, Congress 
is using TILA and its subsequent amendments to help consumers make 
more informed decisions when deciding which credit cards to apply for 
and use on a regular basis.
25
 Section 1601 of the Act states its purpose as 
being “to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the 
consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms 
 
19. Marold, supra note 8. TILA came into being in 1968 with a purpose to “assure a 
meaningful disclosure of credit terms . . . and to protect the consumer against inaccurate 
and unfair credit billing and credit card practices.” 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1976). 
20. Marold, supra note 8. 
21. Id. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 406. 
 
In 1988, due to changes in consumer credit products and creditor 
marketing practices, the TILA was amended by the Fair Credit and 
Charge Card Disclosure Act (“FCCCDA”). The purpose of the 
amendment was to provide for more specific and uniform disclosure 
by credit and charge card issuers with regard to information relating 
to interest rates and other fees. 
 
Id. 
24. Id. at 405-08. Based on constant changes in the financial markets as well as new 
business tactics employed by credit card companies, Congress amended TILA various 
times in the 1970s and 1980s. Id. The amendments served to curb the use of unacceptable 
marketing practices and the issuance of various credit products by lenders by more 
effectively informing consumers about credit products. Id. 
25. Id. at 403. 
5
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available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect 
the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card 
practices.”26 TILA’s role is not to tell credit card companies how to run 
their operations but only to ensure that consumers are not duped into 
applying for and using credit products with terms that they do not 
understand from the onset.
27
 Issuers must disclose required terms clearly 
and accurately, meaning literal falsities as well as misleading statements 
are prohibited.
28
 
 
A.  TILA Enforcement 
 
Congress recognized when initially passing TILA that the 
management of consumer credit was a day-to-day activity.
29
 Therefore, 
Congress delegated broad authority to the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) 
to implement the Act.
30
 Section 1604 of TILA authorized the FRB to 
“prescribe regulations to carry out the purposes of” the Act.31 
Additionally, the Supreme Court affirmed Congress’s delegation of 
power to the FRB, which was done to ensure that any gaps in TILA’s 
regulatory power were filled.
32
 In total, the sources of law surrounding 
this complex statute include “TILA, the FRB’s Regulation Z (which 
implements the Act), the Official Staff Commentary on Regulation Z, 
and case law interpreting TILA and its regulations.”33 
The FRB promulgated Regulation Z for the purpose of enforcing 
TILA.
34
 “Regulation Z promotes the informed use of consumer credit by 
requiring disclosures about its terms and cost. The regulation controls 
certain credit card practices, and provides a means for fair and timely 
resolution of credit billing disputes.”35 Also, TILA and Regulation Z 
 
26. 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2000). 
27. Marold, supra note 8, at 403. 
28. Rossman v. Fleet Bank (R.I.) N.A., 280 F.3d 384, 390-91 (3d Cir. 2002). 
29. Marold, supra note 8, at 404. 
30. Id. 
31. 15 U.S.C. § 1604(a) (2010). 
32. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565 (1980) (“Unless 
demonstrably irrational, Federal Reserve Board staff opinions construing the Act or 
Regulation should be dispositive . . . .”). 
33. Marold, supra note 8, at 404. 
34. Rossman v. Fleet Bank (R.I.) N.A., 280 F.3d 384, 389 (3d Cir. 2002). 
35. Marold, supra note 8, at 404. “TILA and Regulation Z are both aimed at 
educating consumers about the terms and conditions attached to credit card accounts. 
They accomplish this goal by requiring creditors to disclose specific, important pieces of 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/5
MOHR_Formatted_Finalv8 4/11/2012  7:38 PM 
194 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  32:1 
both make a distinction between open-end and close-end consumer 
credit.
36
 An open-end credit plan expects repeat transactions and features 
the application of finance charges to unpaid balances as well as 
“conditioning the amount of available credit on any outstanding 
balance.”37 The essential financial terms of all open-end credit plans 
must be disclosed by lenders prior to the consumer’s first transaction.38 
 
B.  Disclosure 
 
Each day, millions of Americans receive offers for 
credit cards, home equity loans, and auto loans. The 
language is now commonplace to most Americans. You 
have been pre-approved for a new credit card! “Just 
transfer a balance now and you’ll pay no interest on 
purchases—0% APR—until June 1, 2009 with NO 
balance transfer fee. Plus, you’ll appreciate a credit limit 
of up to $30,000! No annual fee!”39 
 
The above language, while familiar to most Americans, might still 
 
information to consumers at various stages of the creditor-consumer relationship.” 
Paulsen, supra note 11, at 138. 
36. Marold, supra note 8, at 408. 
37. Paulson, supra note 11, at 135. TILA defines an open-end credit plan as “a plan 
under which the creditor reasonably contemplates repeated transactions, which prescribes 
the terms of such transactions, and which provides for a finance charge which may be 
computed from time to time on the outstanding unpaid balance.” 15 U.S.C. § 1602(i) 
(2009). Credit cards, retail charge accounts, revolving accounts, and check overdrafts are 
all examples of open-end credit plans. Paulson, supra note 11, at 135. Regulation Z 
places much stricter requirements on open-end credit plans than on closed-end plans. Id. 
at 135-36. 
38. Marold, supra note 8, at 408. 
39. James M. Garrett, Comment,“Congrats! You’ve Been Pre-Approved!”: 
Determining the Correct Approach to a Firm Offer of Credit, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1311, 
1312 (2008). “Even with the increased popularity of these alternate channels, however, 
direct mail continues to have a significant impact as an advertising medium. In 2007, 
United States households were expected to receive approximately 5.3 billion mailings 
pertaining to offers for new credit cards alone.” Id. Because the business of consumers 
and credit has become so intertwined in our society, Elizabeth Warren, President 
Obama’s appointee responsible for implementing Wall Street reform, said clarity in the 
distribution of information from credit card companies to consumers is paramount. Jim 
Puzzanghera, Op-Ed., Reform Begins Here Elizabeth Warren Has Key Role in Protecting 
Consumers, STAR LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), Oct. 28, 2010, at 12. Mere disclosure is no 
longer enough. Id. 
7
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be misleading depending on the consumer’s familiarity with the financial 
industry, as well as their ability to read and understand the fine print of 
an agreement. In an effort to aid consumers, Congress passed the 1988 
amendments to TILA in the form of the “Fair Credit and Charge Card 
Disclosure Act,” directly imposing disclosure requirements to be adhered 
to by credit card companies when producing credit card applications and 
solicitations.
40
 Direct-mail credit card solicitations were among the credit 
disclosures initially regulated by TILA.
41
 With each new amendment, 
TILA’s primary goal of promoting disclosure rather than substantively 
regulating “the terms creditors can offer or include in their financial 
products,” has been maintained.42 
A creditor must satisfy two conditions in order to comply with the 
disclosure requirements set for by TILA and Regulation Z.
43
 First, the 
creditor must disclose all of the information required by the statute.
44
 
Second, the information disclosed must be a true and accurate 
representation of the legal obligations of the parties.
45
 “The purpose of 
the disclosure is to present the significant terms of the agreement to the 
consumer in a consistent manner that is readily seen and easily 
understood, thereby ‘enabling consumers to shop around for the best 
cards.’”46 
 
40. See Rossman v. Fleet Bank (R.I.) N.A., 280 F.3d 384, 390 (3d Cir. 2002). The 
1988 amendments required “applications and solicitations to disclose the annual 
percentage rates, certain fees (including annual fees), the grace period for payments, and 
the balance calculation method.” Id. (citation omitted). Before the amendment, TILA 
required only that “issuers make these disclosures before the opening of the account—a 
requirement ordinarily fulfilled by providing the disclosures along with the card.” Id. 
41. See Rubio v. Capital One Bank, 613 F.3d 1195, 1199 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1817 (2011). “TILA requires that all such solicitations disclose, among 
other information, ‘[e]ach annual percentage rate applicable to extensions of credit under’ 
the credit card agreement.” Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1637(c)(1)(A)(i)(I) (2006)). 
42. Barrer v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 566 F.3d 883, 887 (9th Cir. 2009). 
43. See id. 
44. See id.; see also Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.6 (2010) (outlining what 
creditors must disclose as a consumer moves through the process of opening an account 
with the creditor). 
45. See Barrer, 566 F.3d at 887. “Disclosures shall reflect the terms of the legal 
obligation between the parties.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.5(c) (outlining how the creditor is to 
disclose the information to the consumer). 
46. Rossman v. Fleet Bank (R.I.) N.A., 280 F.3d 384, 390 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting 
S. REP. NO. 100-259, at 3 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3936, 3938). 
“[D]isclosures should reflect the contractual agreement itself” since “‘[t]he legal 
obligation normally is presumed to be contained in the contract that evidences the 
agreement.’” Id. (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 226(5)(c)(1)(iii)). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/5
MOHR_Formatted_Finalv8 4/11/2012  7:38 PM 
196 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  32:1 
TILA and Regulation Z require information to be disclosed to 
consumers in a tabular format.
47
 This format is commonly known as a 
“Schumer Box” in honor of the principal sponsor of the House bill—
Congressman (now Senator) Charles Schumer.
48
 Section 1632(c) of 
TILA describes the tabular format requirements, including general 
appearance, the ordering of information, and the wording to be utilized, 
but does not provide any specific visual formatting examples.
49
 
Additionally, TILA requires that all terms in the agreement be 
“clearly and conspicuously” disclosed by the creditor to the consumer.50 
“This standard requires the disclosures to be ‘in a reasonably 
understandable form and readily noticeable to the consumer.’”51 This 
does not mean, however, that more disclosure is better.
52
 It is about 
striking a balance between complete disclosure on one end and 
information overload on the other end.
53
 “Clarity is about emphasizing 
the key pieces of information that someone needs to know: price, risk, 
easy comparison of other products.”54 Pure disclosure has come to be 
considered somewhat of a dirty word according to Elizabeth Warren, 
 
47. See Marold, supra note 8, at 407-08 (citing 12 C.F.R. § 226.5a(b)(1)-(7)); see 
also 12 C.F.R. § 226.5a(a)(2)(i) (“The disclosures in paragraphs (b)(1) through (5) 
(except for (b)(1)(iv)(B)) and (b)(7) through (15) of this section . . . generally shall be in 
the form of a table with headings, content, and format substantially similar to any of the 
applicable tables found in G-10 in appendix G to this part.”). See generally 12 C.F.R. § 
226.5 (a)(3) (outlining how disclosures in credit card applications and solicitations must 
be displayed in a tabular or prominent location). 
48. See Marold, supra note 8, at 406; see also Joseph W. Gelb & Peter N. Cubita, 
Credit Card Application and Solicitation Disclosure Legislation: An Alternative to the 
Rate Ceiling Approach, 43 BUS. LAW. 1557, 1561 (1988). 
49. See 15 U.S.C. § 1632(c) (2009). The table must “(i) contain[] clear and concise 
headings for each item of [required] information; and (ii) provide[] a clear and concise 
form for stating each item of information required to be disclosed under each such 
heading.” Id. § 1632(c)(2)(A)(i)-(ii). 
50. Id. § 1632(a). 
51. Rossman v. Fleet Bank (R.I.) N.A., 280 F.3d 384, 390 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting 
12 C.F.R. § 226.5a(a)(2) cmt. 1 (Supp. I 2011)). 
52. See Hamm v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 506 F.3d 525, 529 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing 
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 568 (1980)). 
53. Id. The Hamm court based its understanding of meaningful disclosure on the 
Supreme Court’s definition in Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin. Id. “[T]he concept of 
‘meaningful disclosure’ that animates TILA . . . cannot be applied in the abstract. 
Meaningful disclosure does not mean more disclosure. Rather, it describes a balance 
between competing considerations of complete disclosure . . . and the need to avoid . . . 
[informational overload].” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Ford Motor Credit Co., 
444 U.S. at 568) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
54. Puzzanghera, supra note 39. 
9
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President Obama’s newly appointed head of the Consumer Financial 
Protection Bureau.
55
 She said “[d]isclosure has become like shrubbery, a 
dense thicket of words that are a good place to hide tricks and traps.”56 
Clarity of disclosure is important because the average American 
adult reads at an eighth-grade level, while most credit card disclosures 
historically were written at a tenth-grade level or higher.
57
 Credit card 
companies used more complex language to describe contract terms to 
confuse consumers. This confusion led to consumers entering into 
agreements without truly understanding the terms. Had consumers been 
aware of the conditions imposed by the credit card companies, there is a 
strong likelihood that they would have sought out credit cards with more 
favorable terms. 
The compliment in TILA to clarity is conspicuousness. 
Understanding the meaning of conspicuousness in relation to disclosure 
is somewhat unclear as TILA does not define the word. However, the 
Uniform Commercial Code provides some guidance by defining the term 
conspicuous to mean “so written, displayed, or presented that a 
reasonable person against which it is to operate ought to have noticed 
it.”58 Therefore, clear and conspicuous disclosure means that the 
 
55. Id. 
56. Id. 
57. Jaclyn Rodriguez, The Credit Card Act of 2009: An Effective but Incomplete 
Solution Evidencing the Need for a Federal Regulator, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 309, 318-
19 (2010). 
 
Although the average American adult reads at an eighth-grade level, 
most credit card disclosures were written at a tenth-grade level or 
higher. The credit card disclosure documents were excessively 
complicated, included more detail than necessary, and used complex 
terms when only simple ones were necessary. For example, one 
cardmember agreement used the phrase “rolling consecutive twelve 
billing cycle period” rather than using “over the course of the next 
twelve billing statements” or “next twelve months.” Excessive detail 
both lengthened and complicated the disclosure document. Experts 
determined that this excess information made consumers less likely 
to read or understand the information presented. 
 
Id. 
58. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(10) (2010). The UCC provides two examples of 
conspicuousness: 
 
(A) a heading in capitals equal to or greater in size than the 
surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to the 
surrounding text of the same or lesser size; and 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/5
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consumer will not have to make any assumptions regarding the terms in 
the credit agreement.
59
 
 
III. Question of Law 
 
A.  Majority Opinion—Rubio v. Capital One 
 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently 
considered a case that required the court to decide whether the clarity of 
disclosure of the terms of a credit agreement is a question of law to be 
decided by the court or a question of fact to be decided by the jury.
60
 The 
plaintiff, Raquel Rubio, received a direct-mail credit card solicitation 
from the defendant, Capital One Bank.
61
 The solicitation’s Schumer Box 
described a “fixed” APR of 6.99 percent on purchases and balance 
transfers.
62
 “Next to the Schumer Box’s prominent heading, ‘ANNUAL 
PERCENTAGE RATE (APR) for purchases,’ was an asterisk linked to 
a paragraph printed just below the Schumer Box.”63 The paragraph 
stated, in ten-point font, three specific conditions that would trigger an 
 
(B) language in the body of a record or display in larger type than the 
surrounding text, or in contrasting type, font, or color to the 
surrounding text of the same size, or set off from surrounding text of 
the same size by symbols or other marks that call attention to the 
language. 
 
Id. § 1-201(b)(10)(A)-(B). 
59. See Hamm v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., 506 F.3d 525, 529 (7th Cir. 2007). While 
the Hamm court believed that clarity of disclosure was a question of law, the importance 
of this passage for our purpose is the general description of the clear and conspicuous 
nature of disclosure. “If a lender does not disclose [even one required] piece of 
information in the specified way, leaving the borrower to make assumptions, then TILA 
has been violated.” Id. To illustrate this point, in Hamm, the plaintiff received a thirty-
year mortgage from the defendant bank. Id. at 527. The disclosure statement did not 
contain any reference to the number of payments required, which would have been 360, 
nor did it say the payments were supposed to be made monthly. Id. Because the 
defendant failed to include these facts in the disclosure statement, they were found to 
have violated TILA even though such details would seem to the reasonable consumer to 
be commonsense. Id. at 531-32. 
60. Rubio v. Capital One Bank, 613 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. 
Ct. 1817 (2011). 
61. Id. at 1198. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. (emphasis in original). 
11
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increase in the APR associated with the card.
64
 The solicitation, on the 
same page as the Schumer Box, also contained a heading in eight-point 
font that read “Terms of Offer,” which informed the customer that they 
would receive the Capital One Customer Agreement in the mail and 
would be bound by its contents.
65
 The Customer Agreement also 
informed the consumer that Capital One reserved the right to “amend or 
change any part of [the] Agreement, including periodic rates and other 
charges, or add or remove requirements . . . at any time.”66 
Approximately three and a-half years after Rubio applied for, 
received, and began using her Capital One credit card, the interest rate on 
purchases and balance transfers increased to 15.9 percent, even though 
Rubio had not triggered any of the three conditions detailed in the 
solicitation agreement.
67
 Capital One notified her of the rate increase by 
mail and said she could avoid the higher rate by paying off the account 
balance and closing the card.
68
 Rubio subsequently filed suit against 
Capital One alleging, among other claims, violations of TILA.
69
 
After the district court dismissed Rubio’s claim on a 12(b)(6) 
motion to dismiss brought by the Defendant, Rubio appealed to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for 
reconsideration.
70
 The court of appeals focused on the information 
contained in the Schumer Box and the language used to describe the 
terms of the credit agreement, and ultimately reversed the district court’s 
granting of Capital One’s motion to dismiss.71 The court held that as a 
matter of law Capital One did not prove that the terms of the agreement 
were clearly and conspicuously disclosed.
72
 
In arriving at its decision that the Schumer Box terms were not 
clearly and conspicuously presented, the court of appeals found empirical 
evidence submitted by the parties helpful in determining how a 
 
64. Id. The three conditions listed as triggers were (1) failing to make a payment 
when due; (2) the account balance being overlimit; or (3) the payment being returned for 
any reason. Id. The first time a triggering event occurred, the APR would increase to 12.9 
percent. Id. Then, if any combination of triggering events occurred twice during a six-
month period, the APR would be increased to 25.9 percent. Id. 
65. Id. 
66. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
67. Id. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at 1198-99. 
70. Id. at 1197-98. 
71. Id. at 1200. 
72. Id. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/5
MOHR_Formatted_Finalv8 4/11/2012  7:38 PM 
200 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  32:1 
reasonable consumer would understand the terms of the agreement.
73
 
One such piece of evidence was a 2006 study, financed by the Federal 
Reserve Board of Governors (“FRBG Study”), designed to improve 
credit card disclosure effectiveness.
74
 In the FRBG Study’s early rounds, 
when asked what they understood the term “fixed” to mean, “participants 
frequently assume[d] that a rate that [was] labeled ‘fixed’ [could not] be 
changed for any reason.”75 Partially relying on the FRBG Study’s results, 
the Federal Reserve Board promulgated Regulation Z.
76
 Regulation Z 
states in relevant part that, when used in the Schumer Box’s APR 
disclosure, 
 
the term fixed, or a similar term, may not be used to 
describe [the annual percentage] rate unless the creditor 
also specifies a time period that the rate will be fixed and 
the rate will not increase during that period, or if no such 
time period is provided, the rate will not increase while 
 
73. Id. The Federal Reserve Board of Governors, the agency charged with 
implementing TILA, has provided evidence on how reasonable consumers understand the 
term “fixed.” Id. 
74. Id.; see MACRO INT’L INC., DESIGN AND TESTING OF EFFECTIVE TRUTH IN 
LENDING DISCLOSURES (2007), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/dcca/regulationz/20070523/Execsummary.pdf. The FRBG 
Study was aimed at representing a complete range of demographics so as to provide 
trustworthy and accurate results. Rubio, 613 F.3d at 1201. 
75. Rubio, 613 F.3d at 1201 (quoting MACRO INT’L INC., supra note 74, at 33) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). “When asked to define what a ‘fixed’ rate was, most 
participants said that it was a rate that would not change.” Id. (quoting MACRO INT’L INC., 
supra note 74, at 10) (internal quotation marks omitted). “When asked what it meant if a 
rate was labeled ‘fixed,’ most participants responded that these rates would not change 
for any reason.” Id. (quoting MACRO INT’L INC., supra note 74, at 30) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). The term “fixed” has been misunderstood by consumers in relation to the 
way the term is understood in the industry. See Stanton Koppel, Nicole Ibbotson & Helen 
Y. Lee, Credit CARD Act of 2009: Implementation Guidelines, 63 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. 
REP. 205, 205-06 (2009). 
 
The term “fixed,” when used in the context of an APR or interest 
rate, may only be used to refer to an APR or interest rate that will not 
change or vary for any reason over the period that is specified clearly 
and conspicuously in the terms of the account. 
 
Id. at 208.  
The amendment defining the term “fixed” was codified in 15 U.S.C. § 1637(m) (2009). 
76. See Rubio, 613 F.3d at 1201. 
13
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the plan is open.
77
 
 
“Under this regulation, a creditor may do what Capital One did—
describe an APR as ‘fixed,’ without specifying a period during which the 
APR will remain the same—only if the rate is unchangeable for the life 
of the card.”78 
Confusion arises from use of the term “fixed” because credit card 
companies like Capital One, and creditors in general, understand the term 
“fixed” to refer to an APR that is not tied to an index.79 As the FRBG 
Study indicated, consumers do not share creditors’ understanding of the 
term when it refers to credit card APRs.
80
 Capital One argued that a 
reasonable consumer could understand “fixed” to signify that the APR is 
not tied to an index.
81
 The appeals court acknowledged that, while 
Capital One’s position might be true, “it is precisely because reasonable 
consumers can interpret an ambiguous disclosure in more than one way 
that such a disclosure cannot be clear and conspicuous.”82 
In addition, Capital One used the term “fixed” to describe the APR 
in the Schumer Box while listing only three conditions that would trigger 
an increase in the APR.
83
 Then, elsewhere in the solicitation sent to 
Rubio, Capital One reserved the right to change the APR at any time.
84
 
This all-encompassing clause allowing Capital One to change the APR 
completely at its discretion nullified, for all intents and purposes, the 
three triggering conditions stated in the Schumer Box. Based on these 
conflicting messages in the solicitation, the court of appeals reasoned 
that “it [wa]s not ‘clear and conspicuous’ to describe an APR as ‘fixed’ 
when the creditor has reserved the right to change the APR for any 
reason.”85 Capital One continued by arguing that the clause enabling 
them to alter the APR for any reason cured any uncertainty or haziness 
 
77. Id. (alterations and emphasis in original) (quoting Truth in Lending, 74 Fed. 
Reg. 5244, 5401 (Jan. 29, 2009) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 226.5(a)(2)(iii))). 
78. Id. 
79. Id. “The ‘index’ the Board refers to in its new regulation is a publicly available 
measure of the cost of funds (for example, the federal funds rate).” Id. at 1201 n.1. 
80. See supra text accompanying note 75. The Board found creditors often use the 
term to describe an APR that is not tied to an index. Truth in Lending, 74 Fed. Reg. 5244, 
5372-73 (Jan. 29, 2009). 
81. Rubio, 613 F.3d at 1202. 
82. Id. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. at 1198. 
85. Id. at 1202. 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol32/iss1/5
MOHR_Formatted_Finalv8 4/11/2012  7:38 PM 
202 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  32:1 
surrounding the three triggering events in the Schumer Box.
86
 This 
argument did not persuade the court of appeals, which stated that 
“[a]llowing disclosures made outside of the Box to cure a Schumer 
Box’s unclear or inconspicuous APR disclosure would seem to allow 
creditors to evade the tabular requirements.”87 
After examining the evidence presented by the parties and the 
arguments put forth in support of their respective positions, the court of 
appeals returned to an analysis of TILA and the purpose for which the 
statute was enacted.
88
 When considering an alleged TILA violation, 
ambiguities in the disclosure terms are to be “liberally construed in favor 
of the consumer and strictly enforced against the creditor.”89 If, after a 
careful analysis by the court, ambiguity still exists regarding how a 
reasonable consumer would interpret disclosure terms in the credit 
agreement, such ambiguity “should be resolved in favor of the 
consumer.”90 The majority ultimately reversed the district court’s 
dismissal of the TILA claim, finding that Rubio had stated a claim under 
TILA.
91
 The court reasoned that Rubio’s TILA claim was supported “not 
because Capital One failed to disclose its unqualified right to change the 
terms of the Cardholder Agreement, but rather because Capital One 
failed to show as a matter of law that it made its APR disclosure ‘in a 
reasonably understandable form and readily noticeable to the 
consumer.’”92 
 
IV.  Question of Fact 
 
A.  Dissenting Opinion—Rubio v. Capital One 
 
While Judge Graber agreed with the majority in its decision to 
 
86. Id. at 1203. 
87. Id. at 1203 n.2. 
88. Id. at 1202. 
89. Id. (citation omitted). “In applying TILA and its implementing regulations, we 
‘require absolute compliance by creditors,’ Hauk v. JP Morgan Chase Bank USA, 552 
F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 2009), and ‘[e]ven technical or minor violations of the TILA 
impose liability on the creditor,’ Jackson v. Grant, 890 F.2d 118, 120 (9th Cir. 1989).” 
Id. at 1199. 
90. Id. at 1202 (quoting Rossman v. Fleet Bank (R.I.) N.A., 280 F.3d 384, 394 (3d 
Cir. 2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
91. Id. at 1203. 
92. Id. (quoting Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.5a(a)(2) cmt. 1 (Supp. I 2011)). 
15
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reverse the district court’s dismissal of Rubio’s TILA claim, she 
disagreed with the majority’s reasoning.93 The majority held as a matter 
of law that the clarity of disclosure in the cardholder agreement was 
inadequate.
94
 Approaching the analysis this way enabled the court to 
determine whether Capital One satisfied the TILA disclosure 
requirements without having to submit the issue to a jury. Judge Graber 
believed that the clarity of disclosure should be left for consideration by 
the fact-finder.
95
 Her examination and analysis of the solicitation sent to 
Rubio, as well as Capital One’s compliance with the disclosure 
requirements of TILA and Regulation Z, demonstrate that a reasonable 
consumer could have found the disclosure made by Capital One to have 
been clear and conspicuous. 
The goal of a disclosure analysis in this context is to determine 
whether a reasonable cardholder would notice and understand the 
terms.
96
 The relevant inquiry then is “not whether additional disclosure 
would be useful to consumers but, rather, whether the disclosures that 
were made complied with the requirements of TILA and Regulation Z.”97 
Accordingly, the information presented may satisfy the clear and 
conspicuous standard established in TILA. 
The solicitation Capital One sent to Rubio contained a Schumer Box 
that described the APR as “fixed” and listed three events that could 
trigger an increase in the customer’s APR.98 On the same page as the 
Schumer Box and the list of triggering events, a section entitled “Terms 
of Offer” stated, “I will receive the Capital One Customer Agreement 
and am bound by its terms and future revisions thereof. My Agreement 
terms (for example, rates and fees) are subject to change.”99 
In contrast to the solicitation documents considered in Rubio v. 
Capital One, Judge Graber referred to a set of facts considered by the 
Ninth Circuit in Barrer v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., as an example of 
 
93. Id. at 1206 (Graber, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). “I too would 
hold that [Rubio] has stated a TILA claim—although I would decline to hold that the 
disclosure is clear as a matter of law . . . .” Id. at 1206 n.1. 
94. Id. at 1206. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 1207. 
97. Id. (citing Hauk v. JP Morgan Chase Bank USA, 552 F.3d 1114, 1121 (9th Cir. 
2009)). 
98. See supra Part III.A. 
99. Rubio, 613 F.3d at 1207 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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disclosure not being clear and conspicuous.
100
 “[T]he change-in-terms 
provision appear[ed]. . . five dense pages after the disclosure of the APR 
and was neither referenced in nor clearly related to the ‘Finance Terms’ 
section.”101 In Rubio, the APR and reservation of rights both appeared on 
the same page and were displayed in a legible font.
102
 It is apparent that 
the cardholder agreement terms in Barrer are representative of 
inconspicuous disclosure. It becomes necessary to ask, then, how far a 
creditor must go in the opposite direction to ensure that the cardholder 
agreement terms can be considered clearly and conspicuously 
disclosed.
103
 
During her examination of Capital One’s usage of the word “fixed” 
to describe the APR, Judge Graber stated that Capital One’s disclosures 
were accurate.
104
 In coming to her conclusion, she acknowledged the 
majority’s reliance on the FRBG Study.105 Her main point of contention 
regarding the majority’s use of the FRBG Study was the sample size on 
which the survey’s results were based.106 A failure to sample an 
appropriate cross-section of the population can produce results that are 
not indicative of what is average, or reasonable, among the entire 
population.
107
 A sample must be large enough so that the researchers can 
 
100. Id. at 1207 n.2 (citing Barrer v. Chase Bank USA, N.A., 566 F.3d 883, 892 
(9th Cir. 2009)). 
101. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Barrer, 566 F.3d at 892) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 1207 (The Ninth Circuit has “construed TILA and Regulation Z to 
prohibit disclosures that are either inconspicuous or opaque to a reasonable consumer.”). 
The cause for the current circuit split is the divergence of opinions on what is clear and 
conspicuous disclosure to the reasonable consumer. 
104. Id. at 1208. 
105. Id. at 1210; see supra Part III.A. 
106. Rubio, 613 F.3d at 1210. The FRBG Study stated that researchers only 
interviewed nine consumers in Baltimore, nine in Kansas City, and seven in Denver. Id. 
(citing MACRO INT’L INC., supra note 74). In total, the small sample size of twenty-five 
“consumers was not intended to be—and was not—representative of the card-holding 
public, even though the majority is correct that it was intended to represent the range of 
those consumers.” Id. (emphasis in original). 
107. Id. Judge Graber writes that “[a] representative sample is one in which the 
frequency of distribution of some trait corresponds to that trait’s frequency or distribution 
in the population being sampled.” Id. at 1210 n.7; see also Representative Sample 
Definition, BUSINESSDICTIONARY.COM, 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/representative-sample.html (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2011) (defining “representative sample” as: “A small quantity of something such 
as customers, data, people, products, or materials, whose characteristics represent (as 
accurately as possible) the entire batch, lot, population, or universe.”). 
17
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be sure to have captured the variance of opinions that can exist on a 
topic. The larger the potential pool of surveyees, the more individuals 
that must participate in the survey to accurately capture the differences in 
opinion among the entire group. Judge Graber’s discontent with the 
majority’s reliance on the FRBG Study therefore has some justification. 
The potential pool of surveyees would be all individuals eligible to have 
a credit card in the United States. While there is no set of guidelines that 
dictates how large a sample size must be, Judge Graber’s critique of the 
sample size used for the FRBG Study seems warranted.
108
 The FRBG 
Study’s results in determining the average consumer’s understanding of 
the term “fixed” were apparently based on the opinions of twenty-five 
people,
109
 which at first glance appears to be quite small. This is not to 
suggest that the FRBG Study’s results are incorrect. It merely is cause 
for skepticism of the FRBG Study’s findings, given the potential 
difficulty in capturing the variety of opinions that most likely exist 
among the potential credit card holders in the United States, based on 
such a small sampling of individuals. 
In further analysis, Judge Graber dissected Capital One’s use of the 
term “fixed” to describe the APR in the solicitation sent to Rubio.110 To 
support her position that use of the term “fixed” satisfied TILA’s clear 
and conspicuous requirement, she referenced the commentary to 
Regulation Z that distinguished the term “fixed-rate account” from 
“variable-rate account.”111 The commentary described a “variable-rate 
account” as one where “rate changes are part of the plan and are tied to 
an index or formula.”112 It can then be understood that a “fixed-rate 
account” is one that is not tied to an index or formula.113 So when Capital 
One described its APR as “fixed,” its disclosure was accurate and clearly 
stated according to the information contained in Regulation Z’s 
commentary.
114
 
Judge Graber’s dissenting analysis concluded that if the cardholder 
agreement and solicitation terms were accurate and a reasonable 
consumer could have understood the terms, then Capital One should not 
 
108. Rubio, 613 F.3d at 1210. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 1207. 
111. Id. at 1207-08 (citing Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.5a(b)(1) cmt. 5 (Supp. I 
(2011)). 
112. 12 C.F.R. § 226.5a(b)(1) cmt. 1 (Supp. I 2011). 
113. Rubio, 613 F.3d at 1208 (emphasis added). 
114. Id. 
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be held in violation of TILA’s clear and conspicuous disclosure 
requirement as a matter of law.
115
 So while the majority said that, if 
reasonable consumers could differ regarding whether terms are clear and 
conspicuous, then the solicitation does not satisfy the TILA disclosure 
requirements,
116
 Judge Graber took a different approach.
117
 She felt that 
if the terms could be found by a reasonable consumer to be clear and 
conspicuous, then a court should not be able to say as a matter of law that 
the terms did not meet TILA’s “clear and conspicuous” standard.118 
Support for her position exists in Third Circuit case law where clarity of 
disclosure has been held, through a series of opinions, to be a question of 
fact to be decided by the fact-finder.
119
 
 
B. Roberts v. Fleet Bank 
 
The plaintiff, Denise Roberts, found herself in a situation with Fleet 
Bank similar to that of Raquel Rubio and her scenario with Capital One. 
Roberts received a credit card solicitation in the mail from Fleet Bank.
120
 
The solicitation advertised a “fixed” APR of 7.99 percent on the 
introductory flyer and in the solicitation letter, which twice stated that the 
 
115. Id. at 1211. 
116. Id. at 1203 (majority opinion). 
117. Id. at 1206 n.1 (Graber, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
118. Id. at 1211. The credit agreement terms used in Rubio v. Capital One Bank 
never stated that the APR was “‘for life’ or for the consumer’s ‘lifetime,’ nor [did] it 
promise that the rate [would] stay the same ‘as long as’ the account remain[ed] in good 
standing.” Id. at 1208 n.4. This is in contrast to a case considered fifteen years before 
Rubio v. Capital One Bank where the “[d]efendant advertised a card with a ‘Lifetime 
APR’ and told consumers that they would ‘receive a low fixed APR . . . for life!’” Id. 
(citing DeMando v. Morris, 206 F.3d 1300, 1301-02 (9th Cir. 2000)). The solicitation in 
DeMando v. Morris also declared: “You will keep this low fixed rate as long as your 
account remains in good standing . . . . [Y]ou will never have to shop for another credit 
card again!” Id. (citing DeMando, 206 F.3d at 1302 (alteration in original) (internal 
citation omitted)). These two examples illustrate the variations credit card companies use 
in solicitation offers to customers and also demonstrate how direct the solicitations can be 
when the credit card companies choose to “spell out” the terms of the offer. 
119. Id. at 1209 n.6; see Roberts v. Fleet Bank (R.I.), N.A., 342 F.3d 260, 262 (3d 
Cir. 2003) (holding that whether defendant violated TILA’s clear and conspicuous 
disclosure requirement is a question of fact); Rossman v. Fleet Bank (R.I.) N.A., 280 
F.3d 384, 394-95 (3d Cir. 2002) (implicitly treating the disclosure as a question of law, 
such that the court did not specifically discuss the issue and left the question of whether 
the disclosure was truly inaccurate or whether (1) no issue of fact existed or (2) clarity of 
disclosure is always decided as a matter of law). 
120. Roberts, 342 F.3d at 262-63. 
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APR of 7.99 percent was “fixed” and that it was not an introductory 
rate.
121
 On the back of the solicitation, Fleet listed the “Terms of Pre-
Qualified Offer,” which stated in relevant part: 
 
I request a Fleet Titanium MasterCard account 
upon acceptance of my request by Fleet Bank (RI), 
National Association in Rhode Island. I agree to the 
terms of the Cardholder Agreement mailed with my 
Card, including those which provide that the Cardholder 
Agreement and may [sic] account will be governed by 
Rhode Island and Federal law and that my Agreement 
terms (including rates) are subject to change.
122
 
 
In addition, the “Consumer Information” section contained the 
requisite Schumer Box, which again stated that the APR was “fixed” at 
7.99 percent.
123
 The Schumer Box also listed two specific conditions 
under which Fleet could change the APR: “(1) if the prospective 
cardholder failed to meet any repayment requirements; or (2) upon 
closure of the account.”124 The “Initial Disclosure Statement” also listed 
the exact same two conditions granting Fleet the authority to change the 
APR.
125
 
Based on the information in the solicitation, Roberts completed the 
application and returned it to Fleet.
126
 She received her Fleet Titanium 
MasterCard in June 1999 along with the Cardholder Agreement, which 
stated in section 24, titled “Change in Terms,” that: 
 
We have the right to change any of the terms of this 
Agreement at any time. You will be given notice of a 
change as required by applicable law. Any change in 
terms governs your Account as of the effective date, and 
will, as permitted by law and at our option, apply both to 
transactions made on or after such date and to any 
 
121. Id. at 263. 
122. Id. (emphasis added). 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. at 263-64. 
126. Id. at 264. 
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outstanding Account balance.
127
 
 
Thirteen months after Roberts received her Fleet MasterCard, Fleet 
increased her APR to 10.5 percent.
128
 She subsequently filed a class 
action lawsuit against Fleet claiming, inter alia, that Fleet violated 
TILA’s disclosure requirements.129 After the district court granted Fleet 
summary judgment on the TILA claim, Roberts appealed to the court of 
appeals, which reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment 
and remanded the case for further fact finding.
130
 
The appeals court began its analysis by reiterating the purpose for 
which Congress enacted TILA.
131
 Because the issue in Roberts focused 
on the disclosure of the APR, the court centered its analysis on “TILA 
and Board-promulgated regulations require[ing] a credit card issuer to 
disclose the applicable [APR] clearly and conspicuously in a table, 
commonly referred to as the Schumer Box.”132 The information in the 
Schumer Box is necessary to ensure the legal obligations of both the 
credit card company and consumer are accurately and clearly disclosed 
such that each party understands what the credit contract legally requires 
of them.
133
 Therefore, the information disclosed cannot be patently false, 
and it also cannot be misleading.
134
 
 
127. Id. 
128. Id. While the court does not specifically state that Roberts failed to satisfy 
either of the two triggering events listed by Fleet in the Schumer Box and Initial 
Disclosure Statement allowing Fleet to increase her APR, it can be understood that she 
did not (1) fail to meet her repayment requirements or (2) close her account. See id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 264, 271. 
131. Id. at 265. Congress enacted TILA “to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit 
terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms 
available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit, and to protect the consumer 
against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit card practices.” Id. (quoting 15 
U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
132. Id. at 266. 
133. Rossman v. Fleet Bank (R.I.) N.A., 280 F.3d 384, 390 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing 
Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.5(c) (2011)); see also Roberts, 342 F.3d at 267 (stating 
that the relevant inquiry in this case is “whether Fleet’s disclosures in the Schumer Box 
provided ‘an accurate representation of the legal obligation of the parties . . . when the 
relevant solicitation was mailed.’”) (quoting Rossman, 280 F.2d at 391). 
134. Rossman, 280 F.3d at 391 (citations omitted). In addition, “[t]he disclosures 
should reflect the credit terms to which the parties are legally bound at the time of giving 
the disclosures.” Id. (quoting 12 C.F.R. § 226.5(c) cmt. 1 (Supp. I 2011)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). “And, more particularly, ‘disclosures in direct mail 
applications and solicitations must be accurate as of the time of mailing.’” Id. (quoting 12 
21
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The evidence reviewed by the court in an effort to determine 
whether Fleet’s disclosure was clear included the information in the 
Schumer Box as well as terms conveyed outside of the Schumer Box.
135
 
It is not enough that information in the Schumer Box be clearly and 
conspicuously stated.
136
 The solicitation materials as a whole must not 
contain terms that contradict each other, because such contradiction is 
very likely to create confusion for the consumer.
137
 The court’s decision 
to review all solicitation materials therefore enabled it to champion 
TILA’s purpose of promoting disclosure by ensuring that consumers 
thoroughly understand the cardholder agreements into which they 
enter.
138
 
In an attempt to prevent review of all solicitation materials 
associated with the offer sent to Roberts, Fleet claimed “that the ‘clear 
and conspicuous’ standard only applie[d] to required disclosures in the 
Initial Disclosure Statement and the Schumer Box.”139 The court shot 
back, stating that it doubted Congress intended courts to overlook 
statements made by credit card issuers in their solicitation materials 
when the goal of disclosure is that the terms be clearly and conspicuously 
presented.
140
 Fleet also focused on the change in terms clause by 
highlighting “that the Board’s regulations prevent[ed] it from including a 
‘change in terms’ provision in the Schumer Box.”141 Again, the court 
rejected Fleet’s argument and reminded the parties that the issue was 
whether the APR was clearly and conspicuously disclosed in the 
Schumer Box, not whether Fleet was allowed to include the change in 
 
C.F.R. § 226.5a(c) cmt. 1 (Supp. I 2011)). 
135. Roberts, 342 F.3d at 268. 
136. Id. 
137. Id. 
 
When questioned at oral argument about whether the phrase “rates 
are subject to change” would more clearly and conspicuously 
disclose the contractual terms than the phrase “won’t go up in just a 
few short months,” which appeared in the solicitation letter, counsel 
for Fleet responded that the solicitation letter is not the TILA 
disclosure. 
 
Id. at 267 n.2. 
138. See id. at 268. 
139. Id. at 267. 
140. Id. 
141. Id. 
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terms information within the Schumer Box.
142
 
After considering all of the materials transmitted from Fleet to 
Roberts, the court found that a question of fact existed as to whether the 
materials contained any misleading statements or failed to disclose the 
required information under TILA clearly and conspicuously.
143
 
 
C. Conspicuousness versus Clarity 
 
A definition of neither conspicuous nor clarity exists in either TILA 
or the Board-promulgated regulations of TILA. The terms are solely used 
to describe the manner in which certain information, including the APR, 
must be disclosed to the consumer by the credit card issuer.
144
 It would 
then seem that by using both terms, Congress was not looking to create a 
level of redundancy, but was instead intending to capture the individual 
meanings of both “clear” and “conspicuous” in the statute’s regulatory 
verbiage.
145
 
Before ultimately deciding whether clear and conspicuous 
disclosure in the context of TILA should be a question of law or fact, it is 
necessary to understand what each word requires of the credit card 
issuer. In her dissenting opinion in Rubio v. Capital One Bank, Judge 
Graber acknowledged that the Ninth Circuit had held previously that the 
conspicuousness of TILA disclosure was a question of law.
146
 She 
continued by pointing out that the court had not previously addressed 
how clarity was to be decided.
147
 
 
142. Id. at 268 (“Nonetheless, Fleet argues that it is prohibited from including 
‘change in terms’ information in the Schumer Box. However, as we previously stated, 
this argument avoids the central issue in this case, which is whether the APR was 
adequately disclosed.”); see also Rossman v. Fleet Bank (R.I.) N.A., 280 F.3d 384, 394 
(3d Cir. 2002) (rejecting a similar argument made by Fleet that the obligation does not 
concern change-in-terms provisions but the duty to disclose annual fees.). 
143. Roberts, 342 F.3d at 269. 
144. See 15 U.S.C. § 1632(a) (2009). 
145. See Nunnally v. Equifax Info. Servs., LLC, 451 F.3d 768, 773 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(“It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that ‘a statute ought, upon the whole, 
to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be 
superfluous, void, or insignificant.’”) (quoting TRW, Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 
(2001)); In re Jacobson, 378 B.R. 805, 809-10 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 2007), aff’d, 609 F.3d 
647 (5th Cir. 2010) (“A statute should be construed so that none of its terms are 
redundant and should be read to avoid internal inconsistency.”). 
146. Rubio v. Capital One Bank, 613 F.3d 1195, 1209 n.5 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1817 (2011) (Graber, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
147. Id. (“The reasons why we treat conspicuousness as a question of law do not 
23
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Conspicuousness, while not defined by TILA, has been defined by 
other statutes including the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC):
148
 “so 
written, displayed, or presented that a reasonable person against which it 
is to operate ought to have noticed it.”149 The UCC goes on to advise that 
“[w]hether a term is ‘conspicuous’ or not is a decision for the court.”150 
Judge Graber confirmed that the Ninth Circuit borrowed the description 
of conspicuousness from the UCC in deciding how to consider 
“conspicuousness of disclosure” in relation to TILA violations.151 
But just because conspicuousness is treated as a question of law 
does not mean that clarity must be analyzed in the same vein.
152
 Clarity is 
defined as “clearness or lucidity as to perception or understanding; 
freedom from indistinctness or ambiguity.”153 Black’s Law Dictionary 
does not define “clarity” but it does define “clear” as “1. Free from 
encumbrances or claims; 2. Free from doubt, sure; 3. Unambiguous.”154 
Comparing these definitions to that of conspicuousness above, it is clear 
that each term has a unique definition. While referring to generally the 
same idea, each word contributes something different to the overall 
meaning and understanding of the particular provision of TILA which 
uses the terms in conjunction with one another. When taken as a whole, 
“clear and conspicuous” sets forth a standard of disclosure that is 
required when information is relayed to consumers concerning the terms 
of the credit agreement. But when the “clear and conspicuous” clause is 
broken down, it is necessary to determine whether the disclosure 
required by each word (clear AND conspicuous) is satisfied; only then 
will the disclosure be sufficient. 
 
 1. Reasonable Person 
 
In order to determine if a disclosure is complete, a standard needs to 
 
compel us to treat clarity similarly.”). 
148. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(10) (2009). 
149. Id. 
150. Id. 
151. Rubio, 613 F.3d at 1209 n.5. 
152. Id. 
153. Clarity Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/clarity (last visited Sept. 28, 2011). “Likewise 
when a popular or common word is used in a statute, but is not defined, the word should 
be given its common meaning.” 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, 
SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47:28 (7th ed. 2011). 
154. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 287 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis added). 
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be established through which the disclosure can be analyzed. The UCC 
directly states that a term is conspicuous if a “reasonable person against 
which it is to operate ought to have noticed it.”155 The “reasonable 
person” standard is the test established by the legal system through 
which to analyze the conduct of individuals.
156
 A reasonable person is 
one “who exercises the degree of attention, knowledge, intelligence, and 
judgment that society requires of its members for the protection of their 
own and of others’ interests.”157 
Clarity can also be analyzed using the reasonable person standard. 
Just as courts looked outside of TILA to define conspicuousness, it is 
necessary to search outside of the statute to better understand clarity and 
how to analyze the term in relation to the facts of a case. For example, 
one area of the law where clarity is examined using the reasonable 
person standard is in cases where public employees raise the qualified 
immunity defense.
158
 When public employees are sued for allegedly 
violating a constitutional right of an individual or group of individuals, 
the public employee can claim qualified immunity that, if successful, will 
result in protection from damages liability.
159
 The public employee, by 
 
155. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)(10) (2009) (emphasis added). 
156. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1380-81 (9th ed. 2009). 
157. Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1965) (“Unless the 
actor is a child, the standard of conduct to which he must conform to avoid being 
negligent is that of a reasonable man under like circumstances.”). 
 
The chief advantage of this standard of the reasonable man is that it 
enables the triers of fact who are to decide whether the actor's 
conduct is such as to subject him to liability for negligence, to look to 
a community standard rather than an individual one, and at the same 
time to express their judgment of what that standard is in terms of the 
conduct of a human being. 
 
Id. § 283 cmt. c.  
 
The qualities of a reasonable man are “those qualities of attention, knowledge, 
intelligence, and judgment which society requires of its members for the protection of 
their own interests and the interests of others.” Id. § 283 cmt. b. 
158. See Raiche v. Pietroski, 623 F.3d 30, 35-36 (1st Cir. 2010). 
159. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 305 (1996) (quoting Harlow v. 
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (holding “the qualified-immunity defense ‘shield[s] 
[government agents] from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not 
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known.’”); see also David Jacks Achtenberg, Symposium on Enforcing 
Constitutional Rights in the Twenty-First Century—Section 1983 Thirty Years After 
Owen, 78 UMKC L. REV. 869, 869 (2010) (“The offending official, so long as he 
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raising qualified immunity, claims that the law as it currently stands is 
not clear, and therefore the public employee should not be liable for any 
damage caused by his or her actions.
160
 The relevant analysis focuses on 
whether the law at the time of the alleged violation was clearly 
established such that a reasonable person in the public employee’s shoes 
would understand that his or her actions violated the plaintiff’s 
constitutional right.
161
 
The use of the reasonable person standard to determine clarity when 
defendants raise qualified immunity as a defense represents at least one 
example where clarity is analyzed by applying the reasonable person 
standard. Just as the court in Rubio borrowed the reasonable person 
standard for conspicuousness from the UCC, the use by courts of the 
reasonable person standard when determining clarity in cases where 
defendants raise qualified immunity supports the use of the reasonable 
person standard in determining clarity as it relates to TILA disclosure. 
If the reasonable person standard can be used to evaluate both 
conspicuousness and clarity, it becomes necessary to determine if one 
term can be decided as a question of law and the other as a question of 
fact or if both terms need to be analyzed as questions of law. The UCC 
clearly states that conspicuousness should be decided as a question of 
law by the court.
162
 This makes sense because conspicuousness focuses 
on whether the reasonable person would have noticed the information 
being disclosed. TILA’s purpose is to ensure that consumers have access 
to information necessary to make informed decisions regarding the terms 
and conditions of a credit agreement.
163
 To achieve this purpose, credit 
card companies are required to display certain vital pieces of information 
pertaining to the credit agreement in such a way that the relevant terms 
of the agreement are not hidden among pages of incomprehensible 
legalese.
164
 “Conspicuousness” ensures that the relevant pieces of 
information are displayed in a way that a reasonable consumer would 
notice them. Solicitation materials thus contain a Schumer Box where 
companies place relevant credit information in a table that is prominently 
 
conducts himself in good faith, may go about his business secure in the knowledge that a 
qualified immunity will protect him from personal liability for damages that are more 
appropriately chargeable to the populace as a whole.”). 
160. Raiche, 623 F.3d at 35. 
161. Id. at 36. 
162. U.C.C. § 1-201(b)10) (2009). 
163. Marold, supra note 8, at 403. 
164. Id. 
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placed using a readable font size.
165
 The Ninth Circuit in Rubio evaluated 
the conspicuousness of such information contained in the Schumer Box 
as a question of law.
166
 This makes sense because the Schumer Box 
requirements make it a fairly cut and dry question as to whether the 
reasonable consumer would notice the Schumer Box within the 
solicitation materials. The difficultly comes when trying to determine 
whether the information contained within the Schumer Box and 
throughout all of the solicitation materials as a whole is clear to the 
reasonable consumer. 
There is a marked difference between noticing something and 
understanding what you are noticing. This is the difference between 
conspicuousness and clarity. The dissenting opinion in Rubio recognizes 
this distinction by stating: “The assessment of a reasonable consumer’s 
understanding of a disclosure would be more accurate—and hence more 
predictable—if made by an informed fact-finder than if made by a court 
in the abstract.”167 While a court might very well be equipped to 
determine whether relevant information is noticeable within the 
solicitation information, it is not as capable of determining whether the 
reasonable person would understand the terms of the agreement as they 
are disclosed in the solicitation materials. Thus, a fact-finder is more 
capable than a court of reviewing the information disclosed and 
determining whether it is comprehensible in satisfaction of the clarity 
requirement. 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
Disclosure under TILA has become increasingly important as more 
and more credit card companies are vying for new customers. The 
incentive to mislead consumers in an effort to have them sign a credit 
agreement, which they might not fully understand, can be substantial. 
Accordingly, TILA’s purpose of ensuring that consumers obtain all of 
the vital details relating to the proposed credit contract before entering 
into any agreements remains relevant. 
In determining whether the disclosure of the relevant credit 
agreement terms is adequate, TILA established the “clear and 
 
165. Id. at 406-07. 
166. Rubio v. Capital One Bank, 613 F.3d 1195, 1200 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 
131 S. Ct. 1817 (2011). 
167. Id. at 1209 n.5 (Graber, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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conspicuous” standard by which the disclosure is to be judged.168 Courts 
have been fairly uniform in the adjudication of conspicuousness as a 
matter of law. The split among the circuits, however, centers on clarity 
and whether clarity should be decided as a question of law, like 
conspicuousness, or a question of fact. 
Conspicuousness, as it is defined in the UCC, focuses on how 
noticeable the information is in the solicitation materials. TILA, through 
the usage of the Schumer Box, provides an acceptable way for credit 
card companies to disclose information and ensure the required 
disclosure items are prominently displayed to the consumer.
169
 Whether 
something is noticeable is fairly objective in the confines of a credit card 
solicitation document, thus placing it adequately in the hands of the court 
to decide as a question of law. Clarity, on the other hand, does not deal 
with whether the disclosed terms are noticeable, but whether the credit 
agreement terms are understandable given the way they are presented 
and described. This is a much more subjective determination, given the 
variations a credit card company might use in describing the terms within 
the solicitation materials. Thus, the fact-finder is better equipped to 
determine whether the reasonable consumer would find the disclosed 
terms understandable. 
While TILA requires certain bits of information to be contained in 
the Schumer Box, it is not an exhaustive list,
170
 and leaves out additional 
pieces of information that consumers might want when making their 
decision to enter the agreement. This enables companies to place 
information elsewhere in the materials given to the consumers. In general 
there is not one defined way in which to disclose all of the credit card 
agreement information. Consequently, it seems likely that there will 
always be a question of whether the reasonable consumer would think 
that the manner in which the terms were disclosed was clear. Given this 
fact, the fact-finder, as opposed to the court, is better able to determine if 
the manner in which the terms are communicated is clear. 
As an aside, through various amendments to TILA, some certainty 
has been provided to credit card companies. One specific amendment 
provides a standardized definition of the term “fixed” so that, when it is 
 
168. 15 U.S.C. § 1632(a) (2009). 
169. Marold, supra note 8, at 406-07. 
170. 15 U.S.C. § 1637(c) (2006); see also Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.6 (2010) 
(outlining what creditors must disclose as a consumer moves through the process of 
opening an account with the creditor). 
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used by credit card companies in credit card agreements and solicitation 
materials, it should no longer cause confusion to consumers.
171
 The 
amendment adopted the consumers’ commonly understood definition of 
the term as concluded by the FRBG Study.
172
 As a result, the uncertainty 
surrounding certain issues has been removed which will help credit card 
companies more effectively comply with the clarity of disclosure 
requirements. 
In conclusion, courts should adopt the Third Circuit’s approach in 
Roberts v. Fleet Bank and the position posited by Judge Graber in her 
dissenting opinion in Rubio v. Capital One Bank when facing similar 
cases requiring an analysis of clarity of disclosure relating to alleged 
TILA violations. The clarity of the disclosure of the required information 
in the solicitation materials and credit card agreement should be decided 
by the fact-finder as a question of fact using the reasonable person 
standard. 
 
 
171. 15 U.S.C. § 1637(m) (2009); Truth in Lending, 74 Fed. Reg. 5244, 5272 (Jan. 
29, 2009) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 226.5(a)(2)(iii)). 
172. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80. 
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